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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 17. Enabling an Open Architecture 
Environment 
Thursday, May 17, 2012  
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: RADM James D. Syring, USN, Program Executive Officer for Integrated 
Warfare Systems 
Competition and the DoD Marketplace 
Nickolas H. Guertin and Brian Womble 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation 
Historical Analysis of Costs, Risks, and Uncertainties: Moving From a 
Proprietary to an Open Architected Systems, Open Business Acquisitions 
Management Approach 
Tom Housel, Scott Cole, and Russel Wolff 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Market Forces and the Defense Acquisition Marketplace 
William Schmidt, ANGLE Inc. 
James D. Syring—Rear Admiral Syring graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1985 
with a Bachelor of Science degree in marine engineering and was commissioned as an engineering 
duty officer. He completed his Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 1992. Syring is also a graduate of the Defense Systems Management 
College and a member of the Acquisition Professional Community. 
Syring received his surface warfare officer qualification on board the USS Downes (FF 1070) 
where he served as auxiliaries and electrical officer and subsequently as electronics material officer. 
His engineering duty officer tours include ship superintendent for the USS Port Royal (CG 73) and 
Aegis test officer for new construction DDG 51 class ships on the staff of the supervisor of 
shipbuilding, Pascagoula, 1992–1996; combat systems, test and trials officer in the DDG 51 Aegis 
Shipbuilding Program Office (PMS 400D), 1996–1999; and combat systems baseline manager at the 
Aegis Technical Division, responsible for new construction Aegis baseline computer program 
development, 1999–2001. Syring served as director for surface combatants, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), where he advised the secretary on 
all acquisition matters related to CG 47, DDG 51, DDG 1000, and LCS class ships from 2001 until 
2003. His next assignment was as the technical director for the DDG 1000 Shipbuilding Program, 
serving in that capacity until 2005. 
Most recently, Syring served as program manager for the U.S. Navy’s DDG 1000 Program 
(2005–2010). As program manager, he was responsible for total ship systems engineering and 
acquisition of DDG 1000 and associated technologies, including integrated power systems, dual band 
radar, and the advanced gun system. Syring currently serves as the program executive officer for 
Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). 
Syring’s personal awards include the Legion of Merit (two awards), the Meritorious Service Medal 
(four awards), Navy Commendation Medal, and Navy Achievement Medal. 
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Market Forces and the Defense Acquisition Marketplace 
William Schmidt—Mr. Schmidt is a founder and CEO of ANGLE Incorporated, a veteran-owned 
small business located in Springfield, VA. He is a retired Navy commander with 20 years of active 
service as a surface warfare officer and an engineering duty officer. His engineering duty officer tours 
included working as a scientific officer at the Office of Naval Research and as the combat systems, 
test and trials branch head for the AEGIS Destroyer Program Office. At ANGLE Mr. Schmidt has 
worked closely with Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs, including the AEGIS Destroyer 
program and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program, providing technical and engineering 
management support in area of survivability, configuration management, and information technology 
tools and processes. Mr. Schmidt worked closely with the Navy lead for Open Systems Architecture 
as lead for ANGLE support to the PEO IWS 7 Open Architecture program from 2005 through January 
2012. 
Abstract 
Market forces exist in the defense acquisition marketplace as they do in any functioning 
market. The form of those forces is not necessarily identical to what is found in an open 
commercial market. The U.S. Department of Defense is not out to make a profit, and those 
who pay for defense are not consumers. All citizens are beneficiaries of a successful defense 
organization whether they pay taxes or not. However, companies that provide products and 
services for defense are participants in the defense acquisition marketplace. Understanding 
what market forces impact the buyer and the sellers is important to using those forces to 
improve buying power. 
Market forces work within the constraints of the marketplace design. That design may evolve 
from local practices and informal rules or from more formal rules, regulations, and 
enforcement mechanics. The defense marketplace design is dictated by public law, 
regulation, military directives, and acquisition practice. It is unlikely that the acquisition 
marketplace design will change very quickly, even in the face of current and potential budget 
cuts. On the other hand, acquisition practice that takes advantage of market forces present in 
the acquisition marketplace that work well within the marketplace design can be quickly 
implemented. This paper discusses the design and the market forces associated with 
defense acquisition and attempts to point out practices to use those market forces to improve 
the value proposition in defense acquisition for all parties. Better buying power is not just 
about spending less; it is about spending less for better quality, quantity, and capability by 
eliminating non-value added work and using market forces to get to should-cost prices. 
Introduction 
Every year, the United States Defense Department (DoD) spends over $500 billion 
on personnel, operating, and acquisition costs. Of the $500+ billion, $131.5 billion was spent 
on procurement in fiscal year 2011 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 
2012). The DoD is the single buyer, and DoD procurement policy should dominate the 
marketplace. And still, every year there are dozens of acquisitions that report overruns, 
schedule slippage, and technical shortfalls, and many contracts focused on engineering and 
management support are criticized as wasteful and inefficient. This would suggest that one 
or more conditions exist that make attracting and selecting competent suppliers problematic.  
Our free enterprise economy depends on market forces to efficiently allocate 
resources, assign products value, and meet the needs of customers with sufficient products 
in a timely manner. Market forces operate within the defense marketplace as well, but they 
don't apparently work as well. Identifying the market forces that impact the defense 
marketplace and its relative strengths clarifies approaches to improving the efficiency of the 
marketplace in responding to DoD needs. A brief outline of the conditions necessary for a 
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market to function efficiently is a useful point of departure for exploring market forces in 
defense acquisition.  
Markets need buyers and sellers. Markets come into existence because buyers and 
sellers exchange things of value.  
Markets need information. Information enables the buyers and sellers to find each 
other and determine the fair exchange between them. When information movement is 
constrained, markets work inefficiently, if at all.  
Markets need autonomy (players with the freedom to make decisions). When the 
power relationship between buyers and sellers is unequal within a transaction, then the 
transaction is not market driven. Both buyers and sellers must have the power to negotiate 
the transaction and reach a position of mutual benefit. They must have the power to refuse 
the transaction if they can’t benefit from execution.  
Markets need trust between participants. The participants must trust that the other 
party will faithfully complete the transaction, delivering goods, services, or payment as 
agreed. Trust may exist because of a prior relationship, community pressures, or 
governmental structures (contract law and courts). Even if these things exist, trust may be 
lost between two or more participants. 
Markets need rules. Rules may be informal or formal, but they must be known to all 
participants (information). The upside of rules is that they facilitate market function. The 
downside is that they impose transaction costs. The more extensive and formal the set of 
rules, the more likely they are to overburden the market.  
There are some obvious entries missing from this list. Among the missing are profit 
and competition. The opportunity for profit is a critical element in the creation of buyers and 
sellers. Competition, on the other hand, usually makes markets function better, but it isn’t an 
essential element. Both profit and competition exist within the defense acquisition 
marketplace, but not necessarily in the same sense as in an open market. Every 
marketplace also comes with transaction costs, inefficiencies that are not under the control 
of the buyers or the sellers that introduce costs into the marketplace.  
Defense Acquisition Marketplace Structure 
McMillan (2002) classified all government transactions as nonmarket transactions. 
However, the defense acquisition marketplace has all the necessary elements to function. 
The form of each has direct impact on how well the market functions and how effectively 
market forces (supply, demand, competition, and profit) work to provide goods and services 
of sufficient quality and quantity at a fair and reasonable price.  
Fundamental Considerations 
It is critical to remember at the outset of any discourse on defense acquisition that 
national defense is a purely governmental function from which every citizen benefits 
regardless of his or her individual contribution. In time of war, citizens are usually happy to 
contribute their fair share in the form of taxes, even if they are not delighted with the concept 
of taxes in general. They are also focused on ensuring that the equipment and systems are 
the best available so that their people on the front lines will have the best opportunity to win 
and come home alive. In time of peace, the money spent on defense acquisition is 
investment in deterrence. Citizens are less happy to contribute their fair share when they 
don’t feel threatened. They are more likely to suggest that last year’s or last decade’s model 
gun, tank, ship, airplane, communications system, missile system, or other military system 
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ought to be sufficient. The definition of sufficient quality, capability, and quantity often 
become very different from those adopted in time of war.  
It is also important to note that the defense acquisition marketplace is a monopsony. 
That is there is a single buyer, the DoD. Although some may argue the existence of defense 
acquisition organizations in other countries provides more than a single buyer, the size of 
the U.S. defense budget is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next six 
largest defense spenders. Another characteristic of a monopsony is the single buyer is a 
dominating force wielding much greater power than any of the sellers. In the commercial 
world, a common example of a monopsony was in coal country, when the coal company 
was the only employer for the majority of the work force. The company town was created 
and the outcome was dramatically depressed wages and living conditions. In the defense 
business the buyer, the government, is constrained by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplements (DFARS).  
Market Needs 
Buyers and Sellers 
Although there is only one buyer in the defense acquisition business, there are an 
abundant number of sellers. Because of the relative size of the U.S. defense budget 
compared to other nations, a large number of foreign defense firms have also entered the 
U.S. market either through acquisition of entities within the U.S. or by establishing 
subsidiaries in the U.S. The sellers are continuously in competition with one another and/or 
collaborating with one another to win contracts for large and small systems. Systems 
contracts provide long-term revenue streams for the winners and stable sources of supply 
for the buyer. The sellers form new teams with each other or other sellers to pursue new 
opportunities where they may compete against current teammates. 
New sellers attempting to enter the defense acquisition marketplace face some 
significant barriers. First, they have to understand the rules of the marketplace as captured 
in the FAR and DFARS. Then they must understand the informal rules of the specific 
Service(s) and program(s) they are targeting. They must also develop an understanding of 
the language of the Service(s) and program(s). Long-standing defense suppliers 
continuously hire retiring defense acquisition community civilian and military personnel in 
part to maintain current Service- and program-specific knowledge.  
Information Flow 
The availability of information within the U.S. defense acquisition marketplace is 
highly variable. Security considerations, export restrictions, restrictions on the release of 
information to foreign nationals, and the existence of proprietary designs and software within 
production or developmental systems all impede the availability of information to potential 
sellers. Further restrictions result from the practical constraints of a request for proposal 
(RFP). Every bit of information cannot be incorporated into the specifications or the 
statement of work and other descriptions attached to an RFP. Bidders conferences and 
bidders questions help with filling in some of the information voids, but sellers are often 
reluctant to ask questions that may provide more information to their competitors. Aristotle 
Onassis was quoted as saying that good intelligence was extremely important to success 
(McMillan, 2002). Although the marketplace thrives on open information, a particular 
business thrives on important information that no one else knows! 
Systems are often developed using research and development funding and concepts 
or ideas presented by sellers. The sellers in turn work diligently to incorporate their 
proprietary information, software, and designs into the systems. They incorporate the 
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proprietary information to shorten the development cycle, improve system performance, and 
reduce development cost. Once development is complete, the system becomes vendor-
locked because the government cannot release the proprietary information to other qualified 
vendors for competition.  
Efforts currently underway to shift to open systems architecture may significantly 
reduce this information constraint. One of the features of the open systems is the use of 
modular, loosely coupled, highly cohesive architectures. This approach allows the 
incorporation of modules with proprietary content but open interfaces that support 
integration with other proprietary or non-proprietary modules. Each of the modules provides 
functional performance that is fully described without revealing the proprietary information. 
Systems developed using this approach can use open competition for maintenance or 
further development based on the non-proprietary content. The proprietary modules can be 
reserved for the original developer(s), or new modules providing the same or superior 
performance of the same function can be substituted without impacting overall system 
performance or availability.  
Autonomy 
Autonomy within the defense acquisition marketplace depends heavily on the sector 
and the profile of the seller. For example, within the shipbuilding sector, there is only one 
yard capable of building and qualified to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The 
Department of the Navy (DoN) can refuse to buy from the single vendor, but only if it either 
stops buying nuclear-powered aircraft carriers or is willing to develop an alternate source by 
investing heavily in another shipyard to develop the physical plant, processes and 
procedures, and qualified workforce essential in the nuclear power industry.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the small businesses with only defense market 
products are completely reliant on the single buyer. Unless they are the sole producer of an 
essential product, they will have little autonomy in dealings with DoD customers. Dealings 
with small businesses are often shuffled off onto large businesses by inserting small 
business subcontracting goals into RFPs for large systems or services. The relative power 
arrangement is not improved by this approach; in fact, it is often exacerbated. Although DoD 
entities are tied to the FAR and DFARS when dealing with small businesses, teaming 
arrangements between large and small commercial entities are not.  
In the commercial world, start-ups and small companies are known for their 
innovation and the impact they have on the marketplace. Defense acquisition has attempted 
to leverage the innovation found in small companies through the Small Business Innovative 
Research (SBIR) program. Authorized by Congress and funded through a tax on acquisition 
funds, the DoD and the Services have used the SBIR program to varying degrees and with 
varying degrees of success. Although innovative solutions and products are often 
discovered, only small percentages typically become part of funded acquisition programs. 
The barriers to adoption lay both in the cost to incorporate the technology in the larger 
product and in the resistance to accepting that anyone other than the major system prime 
contractor could have a better solution to any problem. The large prime may subsequently 
develop essentially identical solutions with sponsor acceptance and support.  
Trust Between Participants 
Markets can function without trust. Illegal drug trafficking is a multi-billion dollar 
business the works globally and locally with little if any trust between participants. On the 
other hand, the drug business works with brutal enforcement mechanisms at the lower 
echelons and strong financial incentives at the regional, national, and international levels.  
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Trust between a buyer and a seller in the defense acquisition business is critical to 
both parties. The penalty for untrustworthy but legal behavior on either side is a strained 
relationship overburdened with lawyers, voluminous contracts for simple transactions, and 
continuous audits and reviews that cost far more than the value of the product or service. In 
short, lack of trust imposes unsupportable transaction costs on the marketplace.  
Within the DoD acquisition marketplace, the buyers and sellers can be trusted to do 
whatever they perceive is in their best interest. If the buyers believe that their program will 
benefit through full and open competition, they will work diligently to follow that path. If they 
believe that they will benefit by keeping a vendor of record they, will work diligently to keep 
that vendor. If vendors believe that they will benefit by incorporating proprietary information 
into their system design, they will work to do so while retaining restricted data rights. Sellers 
are not running charities, and buyers are not responsible for the health and welfare of their 
vendors beyond the requirements of the FAR and DFARS. This level of trust does not 
require that an adversarial relationship be established between buyer and sellers. It does 
require each party remain cognizant of the best interests of their market partner.  
Market Rules 
The defense acquisition marketplace is well equipped with both formal and informal 
rules. The formal rules include the FAR, DFARS, defense authorization acts, defense 
appropriations acts, DoD directives and instructions, military department directives and 
instructions, and organizational directives and instructions. Informal rules change over time 
to reflect the approach and procedures of acquisition organizations as they evolve from a 
new program through full scale production to sustainment to program shut-down. Informal 
rules can make a significant difference in the relationship between current or potential 
sellers and the buyer.  
The formal rules and the associated enforcement mechanisms (the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency [DCAA], the Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA], and 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) provide a solid foundation for trust between marketplace 
participants but entail a significant transaction cost burden. The buyer’s contracting and 
legal organizations spend countless hours reviewing and revising every procurement action 
to ensure full compliance with the formal rules. In like fashion, large sellers keep their own 
legal and contract management staffs busy reviewing procurement requests from the buyer, 
crafting teaming and subcontracting documents for potential teammates, and reviewing and 
revising proposal documents to fully comply with the rules while winning business and 
making a profit. Businesses too small to afford the legal and contracting staffs try to limit 
their exposure to losses by farming out legal and contracts reviews to qualified consultants 
on an as-required basis.  
The informal rules impose lower transaction costs, but they may result in very 
significant positive or negative impacts on trust between participants. This is where the 
caution that market participants can be trusted to do what is in their own best interests 
comes into play. It is critical that each participant understand the motivations of their actual 
or potential trading partner. When the buyer or the seller does something unexpected but 
allowable within the formal rules, trust is often irreparably damaged. An example is when a 
buyer chooses to extend the contract of one vendor while awaiting the completion of a new 
competition while choosing to let the contract of a second partner performing the same work 
lapse. On the seller side replacing key personnel unexpectedly with personnel not well 
known to the customer raises concerns. In a similar fashion, changing the deficiency 
correction procedure in a fashion that pushes customer sign-off to a point later in the cycle 
but within contract requirements often results in customers pushing for more information and 
visibility into the contractor’s process. President Reagan famously said, “Trust but verify,” 
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referring to disarmament agreements with the then Soviet Union. With international treaties 
and formal rules that approach works well but with informal rules trust is based on 
expectation. Expectation must be based on understanding what your trading partner 
believes is in their best interest.  
Defense Acquisition Market Forces 
Market forces are things that directly impact product demand or impact the 
functioning of the marketplace to meet demand. Some markets, such as energy, are global. 
Commodity markets are usually global in nature. To the extent that the DoD uses 
commodities from a global marketplace, there are no defense–acquisition–specific market 
forces. The rest of the world drives the market; defense is simply a small bump in total 
demand. Defense specific goods and services don’t have a global consumer base. 
The demand for defense goods and services is based in public policy. The extent to 
which the public invests in the nation’s armed forces for warfare or as deterrence to avoid 
warfare drives demand. Changes in public policy priorities push demand up or down or shift 
emphasis between warfare domains and services. This in turn drives money between 
paying for service men and women or changing the purchase mix of ships, tanks, airplanes, 
and armaments. In recent years, billions of dollars have been spent to reduce casualties. 
That may mean better armor, better battlefield medical care, or sending in robots to disarm 
bombs or deliver Hellfire missiles to a target thousands of miles from a ground-based pilot. 
Given that there is a demand for defense goods and services, what forces animate the 
marketplace response?  
Buyers and sellers are both motivated by financial gain in the commercial 
marketplace. In the defense industry, the sellers are motivated by financial gain, but the 
buyer isn’t in the business of making money; rather, the buyer is in the business of spending 
the people’s money to fulfill its security goals.  
Profit 
There is no doubt that profit is the key market force for industry. Without profit, the 
seller would cease to exist. Without sufficient profit, industry would not continue to offer 
products to the defense sector. Northrup Grumman Corporation divested itself of its 
shipbuilding holdings (Newport News Shipbuilding, Avondale Shipyard, and Pascagoula) 
because they didn’t align well with the company’s financial objectives. Future projections 
didn’t show a sufficient profit margin in comparison to other business opportunities (Drew, 
2011).  
The projected order book for both the Newport News and Pascagoula yards was in 
good shape. Newport News is the nation’s only nuclear aircraft carrier construction yard and 
also has construction contracts for Virginia class attack submarines. Pascagoula is one of 
two yards with contracts to construct AEGIS-capable Arleigh Burke Class destroyers. It is 
also the only yard constructing LPD 17 Class LPDs and LHAs. Although Navy shipbuilding 
plans are often fluid, there is little to suggest that either yard will be short of business for the 
next few years. 
Small firms are at least as sensitive to profit margins. Shifts in recent years to bundle 
multiple tasks into large indefinite quantity, indefinite delivery (IDIQ) contracts have pushed 
small firms into teaming with large firms to win small portions of large contracts. This 
approach simplifies the government’s work by pushing the administration of smaller tasks 
onto a prime but squeezes the small businesses profit margins by loading the prime’s pass 
through costs onto work performed by the subcontractor. Small businesses are starting to 
leave the defense business because the profits are not sufficient (Fryer-Biggs, 2012). The 
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departure of large and small businesses from the defense marketplace because of 
insufficient profit margins doesn’t bode well for maintaining a robust competitive 
environment as the nation struggles to maintain an effective military capability while 
reducing spending.  
On-Target Contract Performance 
If sellers are motivated by profit in the defense marketplace, buyers are motivated by 
delivery of goods and services on time, on budget, and meeting quality and performance 
requirements. RFPs are structured to select sellers who offer the best value to the buyer 
where that value is usually assessed as a combination of technical capability, price, and 
recent past performance. Price is often less important than technical capability and 
sometimes less important than past performance in scoring proposals from various bidders. 
Seller selection criteria, when coupled with contract type, provide a strong indication of what 
motivates the buyer.  
Contract preference from the government is clearly with fixed-price incentive firm 
target (FPIF) contracts wherever appropriate. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]; 2010) called for using this contract type 
wherever possible to control costs and reward seller performance. Although this is one part 
of a broadly focused initiative to increase defense buying power, it establishes the business 
interface between sellers and buyers. The same memorandum called for the expansion of 
the Navy’s Preferred Supplier program. Preferred suppliers are those demonstrating 
consistently exemplary performance, which is rewarded with special post-award terms and 
conditions that improve the seller’s financial rewards and business environment.  
Competition 
All competition is not created equal. The better buying power initiative differentiates 
competition from directed buys or other contrived two-source arrangements that don’t 
necessarily achieve the full impact of competition (USD[AT&L], 2010). The existence of 
multiple sellers in a sector of the defense marketplace may drive efficiency, productivity, 
and/or innovation, but only in the case where there is real competition. Buyer practices can 
either increase or decrease the percentage of contracts that are awarded based on real 
competition (USD[AT&L]). Systems bought in a competitive environment but without a full 
data package and intellectual property license rights are typically maintained within the 
defense community for decades as sole source proprietary systems. These one-and-done 
competitions address only cost management of approximately 30% of the total ownership 
cost.  
The power of competition to drive cost control is dramatically illustrated by the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition program. After the selection of two designs, the program was 
moving toward directed awards of the competitively awarded designs to the winning teams. 
Cost growth of the finished ships in both programs prompted the Navy to shift to a 
competitive down-select to one builder/one design with a 15 ship multi-year award to the 
winning builder. The RFP also asked for a complete data rights package with intellectual 
property license rights for the buyer to subsequently compete the winning design openly 
across the industry. The bid prices provided sufficient savings compared to the independent 
cost estimates (ICE), and the Navy was again prompted to restructure its program plan. This 
time, the Navy awarded 10 ship multi-year contracts to each of the two builders because the 
competition had driven the bids down sufficiently to get 20 ships for the money budgeted for 
15 ships (O’Rourke, 2011). Future actions within the program to maintain the competitive 
environment remain to be designed. 
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Risk 
Both the buyers and sellers want to minimize their risk, often at the expense of their 
counterpart. Every transaction includes some element of risk. Standard contract clauses 
routinely call out risks from forces or events outside the control of either the buyer or the 
seller. RFPs are structured to maximize the probability of selecting a seller who can 
successfully deliver the product or service. In the FAR and DFARS, contract types are 
separated into fixed-price type contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. Contract type is 
the principle method of allocating cost risk between the government buyer and the seller 
(FAR, 2011, 16.103). The most prominent attribute of fixed-price incentive contracts is the 
allocation of risk to the seller. The use of target price, share line, and price ceiling added to 
the contract further motivates the seller to control cost.  
From the seller’s perspective, minimizing risk means bidding to deliver only what is 
easily attained. The seller must focus on proven methodologies, well-tested processes, 
trusted material sources based in long and successful relationships, and avoiding the 
introduction or use of unfamiliar technology, concepts, or partners. Change involves risk. 
There are always unforeseen impacts when a well-understood production process is 
tweaked and a seller carrying all the cost risk cannot afford to introduce process risk. This 
places significant barriers to innovation into the marketplace. However, innovation is 
essential to future business on the seller’s part, and warfighting success on the buyer’s part. 
Risk must be balanced between buyer and seller for the marketplace to function well. 
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) programs in industry provide one path to 
develop new processes and technologies while controlling the risk (USD[AT&L], 2010). It is 
in the best interest of both to succeed. That means products are delivered on time and at 
budget while industry makes a profit.  
Future Opportunity, Future Value 
Short-term gains, current market share, and current value are the principal focus of 
much of U.S. business (Steverman, 2010). Sellers in the defense acquisition marketplace 
are focused on staying in business in the short term and winning future business. The sales 
cycle in defense is measured in years and decades. A single ship construction contract 
covers five years. The design and development contracts leading up to the construction 
contract for DDG 1000 spanned more than 10 years. Even the design, development, and 
construction of the two LCS lead ships spanned seven years from the initial concept 
contracts to delivery of the second lead ship (O’Rourke, 2011). Engineering management 
support contracts are being awarded for a base year plus two or three option years. Defense 
companies must focus on winning the next contract; losing the next competition may 
exclude them from a business area for three years or longer.  
Contracts are won through current performance, superior intelligence, and the 
assembly and maintenance of a suitable product or capability. All of these take time, 
investment, and a focus on a future that is three, five, 10, and more years out.  
Conclusions 
There are some salient points to consider when assessing the function of the 
defense acquisition marketplace. Some relate to the structure of the marketplace, while 
others concern market forces. 
 Demand and public policy: The most important market force in the defense 
acquisition marketplace is public policy that is likely to introduce continuous 
churn into the demand for defense goods and services as Congress, the 
president, and world events change.  
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 Contract performance and profit: Sellers in the defense acquisition 
marketplace are driven by profit, but the buyer is not. The buyer is motivated 
to meet delivery schedules, stay within budget, and deliver the specified 
technical product performance. These are the things that keep the respective 
parties in business and keep the people they work for happy.  
 Risk: Risk is the mutual enemy of both buyer and sellers. It is in their 
individual best interest to push risk onto the other party, but it is in their 
mutual best interest to eliminate as much risk as possible and equitably share 
whatever risk remains. Only shared risk motivates both parties to work to 
resolve the associated issues and keep the program on track. This applies to 
technical, schedule, and cost risk. Although choice of contract type and 
structure deals with some areas of risk distribution, others must be dealt with 
in program structure. 
 Information flow: Elements of marketplace structure impact the ability to use 
the marketplace efficiently. Without open flow of information, sellers stay out 
of the marketplace, costs versus price becomes distorted (should cost versus 
will cost), and the ability to achieve the best value proposition at the least risk 
becomes problematic.  
 Market rules: The defense acquisition marketplace has a remarkable set of 
formal rules and enforcement mechanisms. Although they make it possible 
for the market to function, they also impose some substantial transaction 
costs. Reducing the portions of the rules that add costs without adding value 
should be a continuing focus of acquisition reform.  
 Trust between participants: Although a marketplace can replace trust with 
rules and enforcement mechanisms, it impedes the efficiency of the 
marketplace. The defense acquisition marketplace works best when the rules 
are augmented with clearly communicated expectations and consistent 
program execution. That approach builds trust.  
 Competition: The power of real competition to improve efficiency and 
productivity in the marketplace is exceptional. The problem is structuring a 
program to establish and maintain a competitive program environment. A 
dichotomy of the defense acquisition marketplace is the concurrent conflicting 
desire on the part of the buyer to find and keep sellers who provide 
consistently superior goods and services. Managing to both reward 
consistent performers and maintain a truly competitive environment is a 
challenge. 
Summary 
The structure of the marketplace strongly impacts the ability to operate efficiently 
where efficiency is a measure of how effective market forces are in delivering value to the 
buyer and profit to the sellers. Addressing structural issues in the marketplace, such as 
information flow, trust between participants, and participant autonomy, can dramatically 
improve the effectiveness with which market forces can be used to improve the value 
proposition for buyer and sellers. 
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